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Abstract: For a VAR with drifting coefficients and stochastic volatilities, the authors present posterior densities 
for several objects that are of interest for designing and evaluating monetary policy. These include measures of 
inflation persistence, the natural rate of unemployment, a core rate of inflation, and “activism coefficients” for 
monetary policy rules. Their posteriors imply substantial variation of all of these objects for post WWII U.S. 
data. After adjusting for changes in volatility, persistence of inflation increases during the 1970s then falls in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Innovation variances change systematically, being substantially larger in the late 1970s 
than during other times. Measures of uncertainty about core inflation and the degree of persistence covary 
positively. The authors use their posterior distributions to evaluate the power of several tests that have been 
used to test the null of time-invariance of autoregressive coefficients of VARs against the alternative of time-
varying coefficients. Except for one test, they find that those tests have low power against the form of time 
variation captured by our model. That one test also rejects time invariance in the data. 
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This paper extends the model of Cogley and Sargent (2001) to incorporate stochastic
volatility and then reestimates it for post World War II U.S. data in order to shed
light on the following questions. Have aggregate time series responded via time-
invariant linear impulse response functions to possibly heteroskedastic shocks? Or
is it more likely that the impulse responses to shocks themselves have evolved over
time because of drifting coeﬃcients or other nonlinearities? We present evidence that
shock variances evolved systematically over time, but that so did the autoregressive
coeﬃcients of VARs. One of our main conclusions is that much of our earlier evidence
for drifting coeﬃcients survives after we take stochastic volatility into account. We
use our evidence about drift and stochastic volatility to infer that monetary policy
rules have changed and that the persistence of inﬂa t i o ni t s e l fh a sd r i f t e do v e rt i m e .
1 . 1 T i m ei n v a r i a n c ev e r s u sd r i f t
The statistical tests of Sims (1980, 1999) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998a, 1998b)
seem to aﬃrm a model that contradicts our ﬁndings. They failed to reject the hy-
pothesis of time-invariance in the coeﬃcients of VARs for periods and variables like
ours. To shed light on whether our results are inconsistent with theirs, we examine
the performance of various tests that have been used to detect deviations from time
invariance. Except for one, we ﬁnd that those tests have low power against our partic-
ular model of drifting coeﬃcients. And that one test actually rejects time invariance
in the data. These results about power help reconcile our ﬁndings with those of Sims
and Bernanke and Mihov.
1.2 Bad policy or bad luck?
This paper accumulates evidence inside an atheoretical statistical model.1 But we
use the patterns of time variation that our statistical model detects to shed light
on some important substantive and theoretical questions about post WWII U.S.
monetary policy. These revolve around whether it was bad monetary policy or bad
luck that made inﬂation-unemployment outcomes worse in the 1970s than before or
after. The view of DeLong (1997) and Romer and Romer (2002), which they support
by stringing together interesting anecdotes and selections from government reports,
1By atheoretical we mean that the model’s parameters are not explicitly linked to parameters
describing decision makers’ preferences and constraints.
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 asserts that it was bad policy. Their story is that during the 1950s and early 1960s,
the Fed basically understood the correct model (which in their view incorporates the
natural rate theory that asserts that there is no exploitable trade oﬀ between inﬂation
and unemployment); that Fed policy makers in the late 1960s and early 1970s were
seduced by Samuelson and Solow’s (1960) promise of an exploitable trade-oﬀ between
inﬂation and unemployment; and that under Volcker’s leadership, the Fed came to its
senses, accepted the natural rate hypothesis, and focused monetary policy on setting
inﬂation low.
Aspects of this “Berkeley view” receive backing from statistical work by Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Taylor (1993), who ﬁt monetary policy rules for subpe-
riods that they choose to illuminate possible diﬀerences between the Burns and the
Volcker-Greenspan eras. They ﬁnd evidence for a systematic change of monetary pol-
icy across the two eras, a change that in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler’s ‘new-neoclassical-
synthesis’ macroeconomic model would lead to better inﬂation-unemployment out-
comes.
But Taylor’s and Clarida, Gertler, and Gali’s interpretation of the data has been
disputed by Sims (1980, 1999) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998a, 1998b), both of
whom have presented evidence that the U.S. data do not prompt rejection of the time
invariance of the autoregressive coeﬃcients of a VAR. They also present evidence for
shifts in the variances of the innovations to their VARs. If one equation of the VAR
is interpreted as describing a monetary policy rule, then Sims’s and Bernanke and
Mihov’s results say that it was not the monetary policy strategy but luck (i.e., the
volatility of the shocks) that changed between the Burns and the non-Burns periods.
1.3 Inﬂation persistence and inferences about the natural
rate
The persistence of inﬂation plays an important role in some widely used empirical
strategies for testing the natural rate hypothesis and for estimating the natural un-
employment rate. As we shall see, inﬂation persistence also plays an important role
in lending relevance to instruments for estimating monetary policy rules. Therefore,
we use our statistical model to portray the evolving persistence of inﬂation. We de-
ﬁne a measure of persistence based on the normalized spectrum of inﬂation at zero
frequency, then present how this measure of persistence increased during the 1960s
and 70s, then fell during the 1980s and 1990s.
1.4 Drifting coeﬃcients and the Lucas Critique
Drifting coeﬃcients have been an important piece of unﬁnished business within macro-
economic theory since Lucas played them up in the ﬁr s th a l fo fh i s1976 Critique,
but then ignored them in the second half.2 In Appendix A, we revisit how drifting
2See Sargent (1999) for more about this interpretation of the two halves of Lucas’s 1976 paper.
3coeﬃcients bear on the theory of economic policy in the context of recent ideas about
self-conﬁrming equilibria. This appendix provides background for a view that helps to
bolster the time-invariance view of the data taken by Sims and Bernanke and Mihov.
1.5 Method
We take a Bayesian perspective and report time series of posterior densities for various
economically interesting functions of hyperparameters and hidden states. We use a
Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm to compute posterior densities.
1.6 Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
statistical model that we use to develop empirical evidence. We consign to appendix
B a detailed characterization of the priors and posterior for our model, and appendix
C describes a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm that we use to approximate the
posterior density. Section 3 reports our results, and section 4 concludes. Appendix A
pursues a theme opened in the Lucas Critique about how drifting coeﬃcient models
bear on alternative theories of economic policy.
2 A Bayesian Vector Autoregression with Drifting
Parameters and Stochastic Volatility
The object of Cogley and Sargent (2001) was to develop empirical evidence about the
evolving law of motion for inﬂation and to relate the evidence to stories about changes
in monetary policy rules. To that end, we ﬁt a Bayesian vector autoregression for
inﬂation, unemployment, and a short term interest rate. We introduced drifting VAR
parameters, so that the law of motion could evolve, but assumed the VAR innovation
variance was constant. Thus, our measurement equation was
yt = X
0
tθt + εt, (1)
where yt is a vector of endogenous variables, Xt includes a constant plus lags of yt,a n d
θt is a vector of VAR parameters. The residuals, εt, were assumed to be conditionally
normal with mean zero and constant covariance matrix R.
The VAR parameters were assumed to evolve as driftless random walks subject








represent the history of VAR parameters from dates 1 to T. The driftless random







f(θt+1|θt,Q) ∼ N(θt,Q). (4)
Thus, apart from the reﬂecting barrier, θt evolves as
θt = θt−1 + vt, (5)
The innovation vt is normal with mean zero and variance Q, and we allowed for
correlation between the state and measurement innovations, cov(vt,εt)=C.T h e
marginal prior f(Q) makes Q an inverse-Wishart variate.




The function I(θs) takes a value of 0 when the roots of the associated VAR polynomial
are inside the unit circle, and it is equal to 1 otherwise. This restriction truncates





This is a stability condition for the VAR, reﬂecting an ap r i o r ibelief about the
implausibility of explosive representations for inﬂation, unemployment, and real in-
terest. The stability prior follows from our belief that the Fed chooses policy rules
in a purposeful way. Assuming that the Fed has a loss function that penalizes the
variance of inﬂation, it will not choose a policy rule that results in a unit root in
inﬂation, for that results in an inﬁnite loss.3
In appendix B, we derive a number of relations between the restricted and unre-
stricted priors. Among other things, the restricted prior for θ














and the transition density is
p(θt+1|θt,Q) ∝ I(θt+1)f(θt+1|θt,Q)π(θt+1,Q). (9)
3To take a concrete example, consider the model of Rudebusch and Svennson (1999). Their
model consists of an IS curve, a Phillips curve, and a monetary policy rule, and they endow the
central bank with a loss function that penalizes inﬂation variance. The Phillips curve has adaptive
expectations with the natural rate hypothesis being cast in terms of Solow and Tobin’s unit-sum-of-
the weights form. That form is consistent with rational expectations only when there is a unit root
in inﬂation. The autoregressive roots for the system are not, however, determined by the Phillips
curve alone; they also depend on the choice of monetary policy rule. With an arbitrary policy
rule, the autoregressive roots can be inside, outside, or on the unit circle, but they are stable under
optimal or near-optimal policies. When a shock moves inﬂation away from its target, poorly chosen
policy rules may let it drift, but well-chosen rules pull it back.
5The terms mθ(Q) and mQ are normalizing constants and are deﬁned in the appendix.4
In (7), the stability condition truncates and renormalizes f(θ
T|Q) to eliminate ex-
plosive θ’s. In (8), the marginal prior f(Q) is re-weighted by mθ(Q), the probability
of an explosive draw fromf(θ
T|Q). This lessens the probability of Q-values that are
likely to generate explosive θ’s. Since large values of Q make explosive draws more
likely, this shifts the prior probability toward smaller values of Q.I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
relative to f(Q),p (Q) is tilted in the direction of less time variation in θ. Finally,
in (9), f(θt+1|θt,Q) is truncated and re-weighted by π(θt+1,Q). The latter term rep-
resents the probability that random walk paths emanating from θt+1 will remain in
the nonexplosive region going forward in time. Thus, the restricted transition density
censors explosive draws fromf(θt+1|θt,Q) and down-weights those likely to become
explosive.5
2 . 1 S i m s ’ sa n dS t o c k ’ sc r i t i c i s m s
Sims (2001) and Stock (2001) were concerned that our methods might exaggerate the
time variation in θt. One comment concerned the distinction between ﬁltered and
smoothed estimates. Cogley and Sargent (2001)r e p o r t e dr e s u l t sb a s e do nﬁltered
estimates, and Sims pointed out that there is transient variation in ﬁltered estimates
even in time-invariant systems. In this paper, we report results based on smoothed
estimates of θ.
More importantly, Sims and Stock questioned our assumption that R is constant.
They pointed to evidence developed by Bernanke and Mihov (1998a,b), Kim and
Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez Quiros (2000), and others that VAR innovation
variances have changed over time. Bernanke and Mihov focused on monetary policy
rules and found a dramatic increase in the variance of monetary policy shocks between
1979 and 1982. Kim and Nelson and McConnell and Perez Quiros studied the growing
stability of the U.S. economy, which they characterize in terms of a large decline in
VAR innovation variances after the mid-1980s. The reason for this decline is the
subject of debate, but there is now much evidence against our assumption of constant
R.
Sims and Stock also noted that there is little evidence in the literature to support
our assumption of drifting θ. Bernanke and Mihov, for instance, used a procedure
developed by Andrews (1993) to test for shifts in VAR parameters and were unable
to reject time invariance. Indeed, their preferred speciﬁcation was the opposite of
ours, with constant θ and varying R.
4These expressions supercede those given in Cogley and Sargent (2001). We are grateful to Simon
Potter for pointing out an error in our earlier work and for suggesting ways to correct it.
5The probability that random walk trajectories will leave the nonexplosive region increases with
the distance between t and T, but this tendency for π(θt+1,Q) to decrease also aﬀects the normalizing
constant for equation (9). What matters is the relative likelihood of future instability, not the
absolute likelihood.
6If the world were characterized by constant θ and drifting R,a n dw eﬁt an approx-
imating model with constant R and drifting θ, then it seems likely that our estimates
of θ would drift to compensate for misspeciﬁcation of R, thus exaggerating the time
variation in θ. Stock suggested that this might account for our evidence on changes in
inﬂation persistence. There is much evidence to support a positive relation between
the level and variance of inﬂation, but the variance could be high either because of
large innovation variances or because of strong shock persistence. A model with con-
stant θ and drifting R would attribute the high inﬂation variance of the 1970s to an
increase in innovation variances, while a model with drifting θ and constant R would
attribute it to an increase in shock persistence. If Bernanke and Mihov are right, the
evidence on inﬂation persistence reported in Cogley and Sargent (2001)p a p e rm a y
be an artifact of model misspeciﬁcation.
2.2 Strategy for sorting out the issues
Of course, it is possible that both the coeﬃcients and the volatilities vary, but most
empirical models focus on one or the other. In this paper, we develop an empirical
model that allows both to vary. We use the model to consider the extent to which drift
in R undermines our evidence on drift in θ, and also to conduct power simulations for
the Andrews-Bernanke-Mihov test. Their null hypothesis, which they were unable
to reject, was that θ is time invariant. Whether this constitutes damning evidence
against our vision of the world depends on the power of the test. Their evidence
would be damning if the test reliably rejected a model like ours, but not so damning
otherwise.
To put both elements in motion, we retain much of the speciﬁcation described




where ξt is a standard normal random vector. Because we are complicating the
model by introducing a drifting innovation variance, we simplify in another direction
to economize on free parameters. Thus, we also assume that standardized VAR
innovations are independent of parameter innovations,
E(ξtvs)=0 for all t,s. (11)
To model drifting variances, we adopt a multivariate version of the stochastic
volatility model of Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1994).6 In particular, we assume




6This formulation is closely related to the multi-factor stochastic volatility models of Aguilar and
West (2001), Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1999), and Pitt and Shephard (1999).

















The diagonal elements of Ht are assumed to be independent, univariate stochastic
volatilities that evolve as driftless, geometric random walks,
lnhit =l nhit−1 + σiηit. (15)
The random walk speciﬁcation is designed for permanent shifts in the innovation
variance, such as those emphasized in the literature on the growing stability of the
U.S. economy. The volatility innovations, ηit, are standard normal random variables
that are independent of one another and of the other shocks in the model, ξt and
vt. The volatility innovations are each scaled by a free parameter σi that determines
their magnitude. The factorization in (12) and log speciﬁcation in (15) guarantee
that Rt is positive deﬁnite. The free parameters in B allow for correlation among the
elements of εt. The matrix B orthogonalizes εt, but it is not an identiﬁcation scheme.
This speciﬁcation diﬀers from others in the literature that assume ﬁnite-state
Markov representations for Rt.O u rs p e c i ﬁcation has advantages and disadvantages
relative to hidden Markov models. One advantage of the latter is that they permit
jumps, whereas our model forces the variance to adjust continuously. An advantage
of our speciﬁcation is that it permits recurrent, permanent shifts in variance. Markov
representations in which no state is absorbing permit recurrent shifts, but the system
forever switches between the same conﬁgurations. Markov representations with an
absorbing state permit permanent shifts in variance, but such a shift can only occur
once. Our speciﬁcation allows permanent shifts to recur and allows new patterns to
develop going forward in time.
























7See appendix B for details.
8represent the history of data and stochastic volatilities up to date T,letσ =( σ1,σ2,σ3)
stand for the standard deviations of the log-volatility innovations, and let β =





summarizes beliefs about the model’s free parameters, conditional on priors and the
history of observations, Y T.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Data
In order to focus on the inﬂuence of drift in R,w eu s et h es a m ed a t aa si no u re a r l i e r
paper. Inﬂation is measured by the CPI for all urban consumers, unemployment
by the civilian unemployment rate, and the nominal interest rate by the yield on 3-
month Treasury bills. Inﬂation and unemployment data are quarterly and seasonally
adjusted, and Treasury bill data are the average of daily rates in the ﬁrst month of
each quarter. The sample spans the period 1948.1 to 2000.Q4. We work with VAR(2)
representations for nominal interest, inﬂation, and the logit of unemployment.
3.2 Priors
The hyperparameters and initial states are assumed to be independent across blocks,
so that the joint prior can be expressed as the product of marginal priors,
f(θ0,h 10,h 20,h 30,Q,β,σ1,σ2,σ3)
= f(θ0)f(h10)f(h20)f(h30)f(Q)f(β)f(σ1)f(σ2)p(σ3). (19)
Our prior for θ0 is a truncated Gaussian density,
p(θ0) ∝ I(θ0)f(θ0)=I(θ0)N(¯ θ, ¯ P). (20)
The mean and variance of the Gaussian piece are calibrated by estimating a time-
invariant vector autoregression using data for 1948.Q3-1958.Q4. The mean, ¯ θ,i ss e t
equal to the point estimate, and the variance, ¯ P,is its asymptotic variance. Because
the initial estimates are based on a short stretch of data, the location of θ0 is only
weakly restricted.
The matrix Q is a key parameter because it governs the rate of drift in θ. We
adopt an informative prior for Q, but we set its parameters to maximize the weight
that the posterior puts on sample information. Our prior for Q is inverse-Wishart,
f(Q)=IW( ¯ Q
−1,T 0), (21)
9with degrees of freedom T0 and scale matrix ¯ Q. The degrees of freedom T0 must
exceed the dimension of θt in order for this to be proper. To put as little weight as
possible on the prior, we set
T0 =d i m ( θt)+1 . (22)
To calibrate ¯ Q,w ea s s u m e
¯ Q = γ
2 ¯ P (23)
and set γ2 = 3.5e-04. This makes ¯ Q comparable to the value used in Cogley and
Sargent (2001).8 This setting can be interpreted as a weak version of a ‘business as
usual’ prior, in the sense of Leeper and Zha (2001a,b). The prior is weak because it
involves minimal degrees of freedom. It reﬂects a business-as-usual perspective be-
cause the implied values for ¯ Q result in little variation in θ. Indeed, had we calibrated
Q = ¯ Q,o rs e tT0 so that a substantial weight was put on the prior, drift in posterior
estimates of θ would be negligible. Thus, the setting for ¯ Q is conservative for our
v i s i o no ft h ew o r l d .
The parameters governing priors for Rt are set more or less arbitrarily, but also
very loosely, so that the data are free to speak about this feature as well. The prior
for hi0 is log-normal,
f(lnhi0)=N(ln¯ hi,10), (24)
where ¯ hi is the initial estimate of the residual variance of variable i.N o t i c e t h a t a
variance of 10 is huge on a natural log scale, making this weakly informative for hi0.
Similarly, the prior for β is normal with a large variance,
f(β)=N(0,10000 · I3). (25)
Finally, the prior for σ2










The speciﬁcation is designed to put a heavy weight on sample information.
3.3 Details of the Simulation
We executed 100,000 replications of a Metropolis-within-Gibbs sampler and discarded
the ﬁrst 50,000 to allow for convergence to the ergodic distribution. We checked con-
vergence by inspecting recursive mean plots of various parameters and by comparing
results across parallel chains starting from diﬀerent initial conditions. Because the
output ﬁles are huge, we saved every 10th draw from the Markov chain, to economize
on storage space. This has a side beneﬁt of reducing autocorrelation across draws, but
it does increase the variance of ensemble averages from the simulation. This yields a
sample of 5000 draws from the posterior density. The estimates reported below are
computed from averages of this sample.
8An earlier draft experimented with alternative values of γ that push ¯ Q toward zero, i.e. in the
direction of less variation in θ. We found only minor sensitivity to changes in γ.
103.4 The Posterior Mean of Q
We begin with evidence on the rate of drift in θ, as summarized by posterior estimates
of Q. Recall that Q is the virtual innovation variance for VAR parameters. Large
values mean rapid movements in θ, smaller values imply a slower rate of drift, and
Q =0represents a time-invariant model. The following table addresses two questions,
whether the results are sensitive to the VAR ordering and how the stability prior
inﬂu e n c e st h er a t eo fd r i f ti nθ.
Table 1: Posterior Mean Estimates of Q
Stability Imposed Stability Not Imposed
VAR Orderings tr(Q)m a x ( λ) tr(Q)m a x ( λ)
i,π,u 0.055 0.025 0.056 0.027
i,u,π 0.047 0.023 0.059 0.031
π,i,u 0.064 0.031 0.082 0.044
π,u,i 0.062 0.031 0.088 0.051
u,i,π 0.057 0.026 0.051 0.028
u,π,i 0.055 0.024 0.072 0.035
Note: The headings tr(Q) and max(λ) refer to the trace of Q and to the
largest eigenvalue.
Sims (1980) reported that the ordering of variables in an identiﬁed VAR mattered
for a comparison of interwar and postwar business cycles. In particular, for one or-
dering he found minimal changes in the shape of impulse response functions, with
most of the diﬀerence between interwar and postwar cycles being due to a reduction
in shock variances. He suggested to us that the ordering of variables might matter
in our model too because of the way VAR innovation variances depend on the sto-
chastic volatilities. In our speciﬁcation, the ﬁrst and second variables share common
sources of stochastic volatility with the other variables, but the third variable has an
independent source of volatility. Shuﬄing the variables might alter estimates of VAR
innovation variances.
Accordingly, we estimated all possible orderings to see whether there exists an
ordering that mutes evidence for drift in θ, as in Sims (1980). This seems not to be the
case. With the stability condition imposed (our preferred speciﬁcation), there are only
minor diﬀerences in posterior estimates of Q. The ordering that minimizes the rate
of drift in θ is [it,u t,πt]0, and the remainder of the paper focuses on this speciﬁcation.
This is conservative for our perspective, but results for the other orderings are similar.
The second question concerns how the stability prior inﬂuences drift in θ. One
might conjecture that the stability constraint ampliﬁes evidence for drift in θ by
pushing the system away from the unit root boundary, forcing the model to ﬁti n -
ﬂation persistence via shifts in the mean. Again, this seems not to be the case;
11posterior mean estimates for Q are smaller when the stability condition is imposed.
Withdrawing the stability prior increases the rate of drift in θ.
The next table explores the structure of drift in θ, focusing on the minimum-
Q ordering [i,u,π]0. Sargent’s (1999) learning model predicts that reduced form
parameters should drift in a highly structured way, because of the cross-equation
restrictions associated with optimization and foresight. A formal treatment of cross-
equation restrictions with parameter drift is a priority for future work. Here we report
some preliminary evidence based on the principal components of Q.
Table 2: Principal Components of Q
Variance Percent of Total Variation
1st PC 0.0230 0.485
2nd PC 0.0165 0.832
3rd PC 0.0054 0.945
4th PC 0.0008 0.963
5th PC 0.0007 0.978
Note: The second column reports the variance of the nth component (the
nth eigenvalue of Q), and the third states the fraction of the total variation
(trace of Q)f o rw h i c ht h eﬁrst n components account. The results refer
to the minimum-Q ordering [i,u,π]0.
The table conﬁrms that drift in θ is highly structured. There are 21 free para-
meters in a trivariate VAR(2) model, but only three linear combinations vary signif-
icantly over time. The ﬁrst principal component accounts for almost half the total
variation, the ﬁrst two components jointly account for more than 80 percent, and the
ﬁrst three account for roughly 95 percent. These components load most heavily on
lags of nominal interest and unemployment in the inﬂation equation; they diﬀer in the
relative weights placed on various lags. The remaining principal components, and the
coeﬃcients in the nominal interest and unemployment equations, are approximately
time invariant. Thus the model’s departure from time invariance is not as great as
it ﬁrst may seem. There are two or three drifting components in θ that manifest
themselves in a variety of ways.
3.5 The Evolution of Rt
Next we consider evidence on the evolution of Rt.F i g u r e1 depicts the posterior mean
of Rt for the minimal-Q ordering [i,u,π]0. The left-hand column portrays standard
deviations for VAR innovations, expressed in basis points at quarterly rates, and the
right-hand column shows correlation coeﬃcients.
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Figure 1: Posterior Mean of Rt
The estimates support the contention that variation in Rt is an important feature
of the data. Indeed, the patterns shown here resemble those reported by Bernanke
and Mihov, Kim and Nelson, McConnell and Perez Quiros, and others.
For example, there is a substantial reduction in the innovation variance for un-
employment in the early 1980s. At that time, the standard deviation fell by roughly
40 percent, an estimate comparable to those of Kim and Nelson and McConnell and
Perez Quiros. Indeed, this seems to be part of a longer-term trend of growing stability
in unemployment innovations. Our estimates suggest that there was a comparable
decrease in variance in the early 1960s and that the standard error has fallen by a
total of roughly 60 percent since the late 1950s. The trend toward greater stability
was punctuated in the 1970s and early 1980s by countercyclical increases in variance.
Whether the downward drift or business cycle pattern are likely to recur is an open
question.
In addition, between 1979 and 1981, there is a spike in the innovation variances
for nominal interest and inﬂation. The spike in the innovation variance for nominal
interest resembles the estimates of Bernanke and Mihov. The two variances fell
sharply after 1981 and reverted within a few years to levels achieved in the 1960s.
The right-hand column illustrates the evolution of correlations among the VAR
innovations, calculated from the posterior mean, E(Rt|T). Unemployment innovations
were negatively correlated with innovations in inﬂation and nominal interest through-
out the sample. The correlations were largest in magnitude during the Volcker disin-
13ﬂation. At other times, the unemployment innovation was virtually orthogonal to the
others. Inﬂation and nominal interest innovations were positively correlated through-
out the sample, with the maximum degree of correlation again occurring in the early
1980s.
This correlation pattern has some bearing on one strategy for identifying monetary
policy shocks. McCallum (1999) has argued that monetary policy rules should be
speciﬁed in terms of lagged variables, on the grounds that the Fed lacks good current-
quarter information about inﬂation, unemployment, and other target variables. This
is especially relevant for decisions early in the quarter. If the Fed’s policy rule depends
only on lagged information, then it can be cast as the nominal interest equation
in a VAR. Among other things, this means that nominal interest innovations are
policy shocks and that correlations among VAR innovations represent unidirectional
causation from policy shocks to the other variables.
The signs of the correlations in ﬁgure 1 suggest that this interpretation is prob-
lematic for our VAR. If nominal interest innovations were indeed policy shocks, con-
ventional wisdom suggests they should be inversely correlated with inﬂation and
positively correlated with unemployment, the opposite of what we ﬁnd. A positive
correlation with inﬂation and a negative correlation with unemployment suggests a
policy reaction. There must be some missing information.9
Finally, ﬁgure 2 reports the total prediction variance, log|E(Rt|T)|. Following
Whittle (1953), we interpret this as a measure of the total uncertainty entering the
system at each date.



















Figure 2: Total Prediction Variance
9Two possibilities come to mind. There may be omitted lagged variables, so that the nominal
interest innovation contains a component that is predictable based on a larger information set. The
Fed may also condition on current-quarter reports of commodity prices or long term bond yields
that are correlated with movements in inﬂation or unemployment.
14T h es m o o t h e de s t i m a t e ss h o w nh e r ea r es i m i l a rt ot h eﬁltered estimates reported
in our earlier paper. Both suggest a substantial increase in short-term uncertainty
between 1965 and 1981 and an equally substantial decrease thereafter. The increase
in uncertainty seems to have happened in two steps, one occurring between 1964
and 1972 and the other between 1977 and 1981. Most of the subsequent decrease
occurred in the mid-1980s, during the latter years of Volcker’s term. This picture
suggests that the growing stability of the economy may reﬂect a return to stability,
though the earlier period of stability proved to be short-lived.
3.6 The Evolution of θt
There is no question that variation in R is an interesting and important feature
of the data, but does it alter the patterns of drift in θ documented in our earlier
paper? Our main interests concern movements in core inﬂation, the natural rate
of unemployment, inﬂation persistence, the degree of policy activism, and how they
relate to one another. Our interest in these features follows from their role in stories
about how changes in monetary policy may have contributed to the rise and fall of
inﬂa t i o ni nt h e1970s and 1980s.
3.6.1 Core Inﬂation and the Natural Rate of Unemployment
The ﬁrst set of ﬁg u r e sd e p i c t sm o v e m e n t si nc o r ei n ﬂation and the natural rate of un-
employment, which are estimated from local linear approximations to mean inﬂation
and unemployment, evaluated at the posterior mean, E(θt|T). Write (1) in companion
form as
zt = µt|T + At|Tzt−1 + ut, (27)
where zt consists of current and lagged values of yt, µt|T contains the intercepts in
E(θt|T),a n dAt|T contains the autoregressive parameters. By analogy with a time-
invariant model, mean inﬂation at t can be approximated by
¯ πt = sπ(I − At|T)
−1µt|T, (28)
where sπ is a row vector that selects inﬂation from zt. Similarly, mean unemployment
can be approximated as
¯ ut = su(I − At|T)
−1µt|T, (29)
where su selects unemployment from zt.
Figures 3 portrays the evolution of ¯ πt and ¯ ut for the ordering [i,u,π]0.T w of e a t u r e s
are worth noting. First, allowing for drift in Rt does not eliminate economically
meaningful movements in core inﬂation or the natural rate. On the contrary, the
estimates are similar to those in our earlier paper. Core inﬂa t i o ns w e e p su pf r o m
around 1.5 percent in the early 1960s, rises to a peak of approximately 8 percent in
the late 1970s, and then falls to a range of 2.5 to 3.5 percent through most of the
151980s and 1990s. The natural rate of unemployment also rises in the late 1960s and
1970s and falls after 1980.
Second, it remains true that movements in ¯ πt and ¯ ut are highly correlated with
one another, in accordance with the predictions of Parkin (1993) and Ireland (1999).
The unconditional correlation is 0.748.
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Figure 3: Core Inﬂation and the Natural Rate of Unemployment
Table 3 and ﬁgures 4 and 5 characterize the main sources of uncertainty about
these estimates. The table and ﬁg u r e sa r eb a s e do nam e t h o dd e v e l o p e db yS i m sa n d
Zha (1999) for constructing error bands for impulse response functions. We start by








Vθ is the KT x KT10 covariance matrix for θ
T and ∂¯ π/∂θ is the TxK Tmatrix
of partial derivatives of the function that maps VAR parameters into core inﬂation,
evaluated at the posterior mean of θ
T. The posterior covariance Vθ is estimated from
the ensemble of Metropolis draws, and derivatives were calculated numerically.11
V¯ π is a large object, and we need a tractable way to represent the information
it contains. Sims and Zha recommend error bands based on the ﬁrst few principal
components.12 Let V¯ π = WΛW 0, where Λ is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues and
10K is the number of elements in θ, and T represents the number of years. We focused on every
fourth observation to keep V to a manageable size.
11This roundabout method for approximating V¯ π was used because the direct estimate was con-
taminated by a few outliers, which dominated the principal components decomposition on which
Sims-Zha bands are based. The outliers may reﬂect shortcomings of our linear approximations near
t h eu n i tr o o tb o u n d a r y .
12If the elements of ¯ πt were uncorrelated across t, it would be natural to focus instead on the
diagonal elements of Vπ, e.g. by graphing the posterior mean plus or minus two standard errors
at each date. But ¯ πt is serially correlated, and Sims and Zha argue that a collection of principal
components bands better represents the shape of the posterior in such cases.
16W is an orthonormal matrix of eigenvectors. A two-sigma error band for the ith
principal component is
¯ πt ± 2λ
1/2
i Wi, (31)
where λi is the variance of the ith principal component and Wi is the ith column of
W.
Table 3 reports the cumulative proportion of the total variation for which the
principal components account. The second column refers to V¯ π, and the third column
decomposes the covariance matrix for the natural rate, V¯ u. The other columns are
discussed below.
Table 3: Principal Component Decomposition for Sims-Zha Bands
V¯ π V¯ u Vgππ VA
1st PC 0.521 0.382 0.374 0.662
2nd PC 0.604 0.492 0.490 0.801
3rd PC 0.674 0.597 0.561 0.870
4th PC 0.715 0.685 0.612 0.906
5th PC 0.750 0.727 0.662 0.936
6th PC 0.778 0.767 0.701 0.949
8th PC 0.822 0.820 0.756 0.972
10th PC 0.851 0.856 0.800 0.984
Note: Entries represent the cumulative percentage of the total variation
(trace of V )f o rw h i c ht h eﬁrst n principal components account.
One interesting feature is the number of non-trivial components. The ﬁrst princi-
pal component in V¯ π and V¯ u accounts for 40 to 50 percent of the total variation, and
the ﬁrst 5 jointly account for about 75 percent. This suggests an important depar-
ture from time invariance. In a time-invariant model, there would be a single factor
representing uncertainty about the location of the terminal estimate, but smoothed
estimates going backward in time would be perfectly correlated with the terminal es-
timate and would contribute no additional uncertainty.13 V would be a TxT matrix
with rank one, and the single principal component would describe uncertainty about
the terminal location. In a nearly time-invariant model, i.e. one with small Q,t h e
path to the terminal estimate might wiggle a little, but one would still expect uncer-
tainty about the terminal estimate to dominate. That the ﬁrst component accounts
for a relatively small fraction of the total suggests there is also substantial variation
in the shape of the path.
13Setting Q =0in the Kalman ﬁlter implies Pt+1|t = Pt|t. Then the covariance matrix in the
backward recursion of the Gibbs sampler would be Pt|t+1 =0 , implying a perfect correlation between
draws of θt+1 and θt.
17E r r o rb a n d sf o rc o r ei n ﬂa t i o na r es h o w ni nﬁgure 4. The central dotted line
is the posterior mean estimate, reproduced from ﬁgure 3. The horizontal line is a
benchmark, end-of-sample, time-invariant estimate of mean inﬂation.
The ﬁrst principal component, which accounts for roughly half the total variation,
describes uncertainty about the location of core inﬂa t i o ni nt h el a t e1960s and 1970s.
As core inﬂation increased, so too did uncertainty about the mean, and by the end of
the decade a two-sigma band ranged from 2 to 14 percent. The growing uncertainty
about core inﬂation seems to be related to changes in inﬂation persistence. Core
inﬂation can be interpreted as a long-horizon forecast, and the variance of long-
horizon forecasts depends positively on the degree of persistence. As shown below,
inﬂation also became more persistent as core inﬂation rose. Indeed, our estimates of
inﬂation persistence are highly correlated with the width of the ﬁrst error band.
Components 3 through 5 portray uncertainty about the number of local peaks in
the 1970s, and they jointly account for about 15 percent of the total variation. Bands
for these components cross several times, a sign that some paths had more peaks than
others. For example, in panel 3, trajectories associated with a global peak at the end
of the 1970s tended also to have a local peak at the end of the 1960s. In contrast,
paths that reached a global peak in the mid-1970s tended to have a single peak.
Finally, the sixth component loads heavily on the last few years in the sample,
describing uncertainty about core inﬂation in the late 1990s. At the end of 2000, a
two-sigma band for this component ranged from approximately 1 to 5 percent.
Error bands for the natural rate are constructed in the same way, and they are
shown in ﬁgure 5. Once again, the central dotted line is the posterior mean estimate,
and the horizontal line is an end-of-sample, time-invariant estimate of mean unem-
ployment. The ﬁrst principal component in V¯ u also characterizes uncertainty about
the 1970s. The error band widens in the late 1960s when the natural rate began to
rise, and it narrows around 1980 when the mean estimate fell. The band achieved
its maximum width around the time of the oil shocks, when it ranged from roughly
4t o11 percent. The width of this band also seems to be related to changes in the
persistence of shocks to unemployment.
The second, third, and fourth components load heavily on the other years of
the sample, jointly accounting for about 30 percent of the total variation. Roughly
speaking, they cover intervals of plus or minus 1 percentage point around the mean.
The ﬁfth and sixth components account for 8 percent of the variation, and they seem
to be related to uncertainty about the timing and number of peaks in the natural
rate.
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Figure 4: Two-Sigma Error Bands for Core Inﬂation
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Figure 5: Two-Sigma Error Bands for the Natural Rate of Unemployment
193.6.2 Inﬂation Persistence
Next we turn to evidence on the evolution of second moments of inﬂation. Second









evaluated at the posterior mean of θ and R.A n e s t i m a t e o f fππ(ω,t) is shown in































Figure 6: Spectrum for Inﬂation
Again, the estimates are similar to those reported in Cogley and Sargent (2001).
T h ei n t r o d u c t i o no fd r i f ti nRt does not undermine our evidence on variation in the
spectrum for inﬂation.
The most signiﬁcant feature of this graph is the variation over time in the mag-
nitude of low frequency power. In our earlier paper, we interpreted the spectrum
at zero as a measure of inﬂation persistence. Here that interpretation is no longer
quite right, because variation in low-frequency power depends not only on drift in the
autoregressive parameters, At|T, but also on movements in the innovation variance,





provides a better measure of persistence. The normalized spectrum is the spectrum
divided by the variance in each year. The normalization adjusts for changes in in-
novation variances and measures autocorrelation rather than autocovariance. We
interpret gππ(0,t) as a measure of inﬂation persistence.
20Estimates of the normalized spectrum are shown in ﬁgure 7. As in ﬁgure 6,
the dominant feature is the variation over time in low-frequency power, though the
variation in gππ(0,t) diﬀers somewhat from that in fππ(0,t). Instead of sharp spikes
in the 1970s, gππ(0,t) sweeps gradually upward in the latter half of the 1960s and
remains high throughout the 1970s. The spectrum at zero falls sharply after 1980,
























Figure 7: Normalized Spectrum for Inﬂation
Figure 8 depicts two-sigma error bands for gππ(0,t), based on the principal com-
ponents of its posterior covariance matrix, Vgππ. The latter was estimated in the same
way as V¯ π or V¯ u.T h et h i r dc o l u m ni nt a b l e3i n d i c a t e st h a tt h eﬁrst component in
Vgππ accounts for only 37 percent of the total variation and that the ﬁrst 5 compo-
nents jointly account for 84 percent. Again, this signiﬁes substantial variation in the
shape of the path for gππ(0,t).
Error bands for the ﬁrst two components load heavily on the 1970s. Although the
bands suggest there was greater persistence than in the early 1960s or mid-1990s, the
precise magnitude of the increase is hard to pin down. Roughly speaking, error bands
for the ﬁrst two components suggest that gππ(0,t) was somewhere between 2 and 10.
For the sake of comparison, a univariate AR(1)p r o c e s sw i t hc o e ﬃcients of 0.85 to
0.97 has values of gππ(0) in this range. In contrast, the ﬁgure suggests that inﬂation
was approximately white noise in the early 1960s and not far from white noise in the
mid-1990s. Uncertainty about inﬂation persistence was increasing again at the end
of the sample.
The third, fourth, and ﬁfth components reﬂect uncertainty about the timing and
number of peaks in gππ(0,t). For example, panels 3 and 5 suggest that paths on
which there was a more gradual increase in persistence tended to have a big global
peak in the late 1970s, while those on which there was a more rapid increase tended
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Figure 8: Two-Sigma Error Bands for the Normalized Spectrum At Zero
to have comparable twin peaks, ﬁrst in the late 1960s and then again in 1980. Panel
4 suggests that some paths had twin peaks at the time of the oil shocks, while others
had a single peak in 1980. These components jointly account for about 17p e r c e n to f
the total variation.
One of the questions in which we are most interested concerns the relation be-
tween inﬂation persistence and core inﬂation. In Cogley and Sargent (2001), we
reported evidence of a strong positive correlation. Here we also ﬁn das t r o n gp o s i t i v e
correlation, equal to 0.92.








Core Inflation (x 100)
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Figure 9: Core Inﬂation and Inﬂation Persistence
22The relation between the two series is illustrated in ﬁgure 9, which reproduces
estimates from ﬁgures 3 and 7. As core inﬂation rose in the 1960s and 1970s, inﬂation
also became more persistent. Both features fell sharply during the Volcker disinﬂation.
This correlation is problematic for the escape route models of Sargent (1999) and Cho,
Williams, and Sargent (2002), which predict that inﬂation persistence grows along
the transition from high to low inﬂation. Our estimates suggest the opposite pattern.
3.6.3 Monetary Policy Activism
Finally, we consider evidence on the evolution of policy activism. Following Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2000), we estimate this from a forward-looking Taylor rule with
interest smoothing,
it = β0 + β1Et¯ πt,t+hπ + β2Et¯ ut,t+hu + β3it−1 + ηt, (34)
where ¯ πt,t+hπ represents average inﬂation from t to t + hπ and ¯ ut,t+hu is average
unemployment. The activism parameter is deﬁned as A = β1(1 − β3)−1, and the
policy rule is said to be activist if A ≥ 1.W i t haR i c a r d i a nﬁscal policy, an activist
monetary rule delivers a determinate equilibrium. Otherwise, sunspots may matter
for inﬂation and unemployment.
We interpret the parameters of the policy rule as projection coeﬃcients and com-
pute projections from our VAR. This is done via two-stage least squares on a date-by-
date basis. The ﬁrst step involves projecting the Fed’s forecasts Et¯ πt,t+hπ and Et¯ ut,t+hu
onto a set of instruments, and the second involves projecting current interest rates
onto the ﬁtted values. At each date, we parameterize the VAR with posterior mean
estimates of θt and Rt and calculate population projections associated with those
values.
The instruments chosen for the ﬁrst-stage projection must be elements of the Fed’s
information set. Notice that a complete speciﬁcation of their information set is un-
necessary; a subset of their conditioning variables is suﬃcient for forming ﬁrst-stage
projections, subject of course to the order condition for identiﬁcation. Among other
variables, the Fed observes lags of inﬂation, unemployment, and nominal interest
when making current-quarter decisions, and we project future inﬂation and unem-
ployment onto a constant and two lags of each. Thus, our instruments for the Fed’s
forecasts Et¯ πt,t+hπ and Et¯ ut,t+hu are the VAR forecasts Et−1¯ πt,t+hπ and Et−1¯ ut,t+hu,
respectively.
Here we follow McCallum, who warns against the assumption that the Fed sees
current quarter inﬂation and unemployment when making decisions. This strategy
also sidesteps assumptions about how to orthogonalize current quarter innovations.
This is an important advantage of the Clarida, et. al. approach relative to structural
VAR methods. Establishing that the Fed can observe some v a r i a b l e si se a s i e rt h a n
compiling a complete list of what the Fed sees.
23It does impose cross-equation restrictions on the VAR, however, since it relates
one-step ahead forecasts for the nominal interest rate to averages of multi-step fore-
casts of inﬂation and unemployment. We checked these cross-equation restrictions
by comparing one-step ahead VAR forecasts for the interest rate with those implied
by the estimated Clarida, et. al. rule, and we found that the two forecasts track one
another very closely. The mean diﬀerence between the two is only 1 basis point at an
annual rate, and the standard deviation is only 8 basis points. The VAR predictions
are marginally better, with an innovation standard deviation of 0.877 versus 0.879
for the Clarida, et. al. rule, but the diﬀerence is in the third decimal point. Thus,
the cross-equation restrictions seem admissible.
Point estimates for A are shown in ﬁgure 10. Here we assume hπ =4and hu =2 ,
but the results for one-quarter ahead forecasts are similar. The estimates broadly
resemble those reported by Clarida, et. al., as well as those in our earlier paper.
The estimated policy rule was activist in the early 1960s, but became approximately
neutral in the late 1960s. In the early 1970s, the policy rule turned passive, and it
remained so until the early 1980s. The estimate of A rose sharply around the time
of the Volcker disinﬂation and has remained in the activist region ever since. As
shown in ﬁgure 11,t h ee s t i m a t e so fA are inversely related to core inﬂation and the
normalized spectrum at zero, suggesting that changes in policy activism may have
contributed to the rise and fall of inﬂation as well as to changes in its persistence.








Figure 10: Estimates of the Activism Coeﬃcient























































corr = -0.72  corr = -0.79 
Figure 11: Policy Activism, Core Inﬂation, and Inﬂation Persistence
24Figure 12 suggests, however, that some qualiﬁcations are necessary, especially at
the beginning and end of the sample. The ﬁgure portrays two-sigma error bands
based on the principal components of the posterior covariance matrix, VA. The last
column of table 3 shows that several principal components contribute to VA,w i t ht h e
ﬁrst component accounting for about two-thirds of the total variation. That there is
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Figure 12: Two-Sigma Error Bands for the Activism Parameter
But the shape of the path is well determined only in the middle of the sample. The
ﬁrst four principal components record substantial uncertainty at the beginning and
end. We interpret this as a symptom of weak identiﬁcation. Substantial uncertainty
about A occurs at times when inﬂation is weakly persistent. Our instruments have
little relevance when future inﬂation is weakly correlated with lagged variables, and
the policy rule parameters are weakly identiﬁed at such times. Thus, inferences
about A are fragile at the beginning and end of the sample. There is better evidence
of changes in A during the middle of the sample. Lagged variables are more relevant
as instruments for the 1970s, when inﬂation and unemployment were very persistent,
and for that period the estimates are more precise.
The next ﬁgure characterizes more precisely how the posterior for At diﬀers across
the Burns and Volcker-Greenspan terms. It illustrates histograms for At for the years
1975, 1985, and 1995. The histograms were constructed by calculating an activism
25parameter for each draw of θt and Rt in our simulation, for a total of 5000 in each
year.14 Values for 1975 are shown in black, those for 1985 are in white, and estimates
for 1995 are shown in gray.
In 1975, the probability mass was concentrated near 1, and the probability that
At > 1 was 0.208. By 1985, the center of the distribution had shifted to the right,
and the probability that At > 1 had increased to 0.919. The distribution for 1995 is















Figure 13: Histograms for At in Selected Years
similar to that for 1985, with a 0.941 probability that At > 1. Comparing estimates
along the same sample paths, the probability that At increased between 1975 and
1985 is 0.923, and the probability that it increased between 1975 and 1995 is 0.943.
The estimates seem to corroborate those reported by Clarida, et. al. that mone-
tary policy was passive in the 1970s and activist for much of the Volcker-Greenspan
era. Estimates for the latter period are less precise, but it seems clear that the
probability distribution for At shifted to the right.
3.7 Tests for θ Stability
Finally, we consider classical tests for variation in θ. Bernanke and Mihov (1998a,b)
were also concerned about the potential for shifts in VAR parameters arising from
changes in monetary policy, and they applied a test developed by Andrews (1993) to
examine stability of θ. For reduced form vector autoregressions similar to ours, they
were unable to reject the hypothesis of time invariance.
We applied the same test to our data and found the same results. We considered
two versions of Andrews’s sup-LM test, one that examines parameter stability for the
VAR as a whole and another that tests stability on an equation-by-equation basis.
The results are summarized in table 4. Columns labelled with variable names refer
14Outliers are collected in the end bins.
26to single-equation tests, and the column labelled ‘VAR’ refers to a test for the system
as a whole. In each case, we fail to reject that θ is time invariant.15
Bernanke and Mihov correctly concluded that the test provides little evidence
against stability of θ. But does the result constitute evidence against parameter
instability? A failure to reject provides evidence against an alternative hypothesis
only if it has reasonably high power. Whether this test has high power against a
model like ours is an open question, so we decided to investigate it.
Table 4: Andrews’s sup-LM Test
Nominal Interest Unemployment Inﬂation VAR
Data F F F F
Power 0.136 0.172 0.112 0.252
Note: An ‘F’ means the test fails to reject at the 10 percent level when applied
to actual data. Entries in the second row refer to the fraction of artiﬁcial
samples in which the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent level.
To check the power of the test, we performed a Monte Carlo simulation using
our drifting parameter VAR as a data generating process. To generate artiﬁcial
data, we parameterized equation (1)w i t hd r a w so fθ
T,HT, and B from the posterior
density. For each draw of (θ
T,HT,B), w eg e n e r a t e da na r t i ﬁcial sample for inﬂation,
unemployment, and nominal interest and then calculated the sup-LM statistics. We
performed 10,000 replications and counted the fraction of samples in which the null
hypothesis of constant θ is rejected at the 5 percent level. The results are summarized
in the second row of table 4.
The power of the test is never very high. The VAR test has highest the success
rate, detecting drift in θ in about one-fourth of the samples. The detection probabil-
ities are lower in the single equation tests, which reject at the 5 percent level in only
about 14 percent of the samples. Thus, even when θ drifts in the way we describe, a
failure to reject is at least 3 times as likely as a rejection.
Andrews’s test is designed to have power against alternatives involving a single
shift in θ at some unknown break date. The results of this experiment may just
reﬂect that this test is less well suited to detect alternatives such as ours that involve
continual shifts in parameters. Accordingly, we also investigate a test developed by
Nyblom (1989) and Hansen (1992) that is designed to have power against alternatives
in which parameters evolve as driftless random walks. Results for the Nyblom-Hansen
test are summarized in table 5.
15We also performed a Monte Carlo simulation to check the size of the Andrews test; the results
conﬁrmed that size distortions do not explain the failure to reject.
27Table 5: The Nyblom-Hansen Test
Nominal Interest Unemployment Inﬂation VAR
Data F F F F
Power 0.076 0.170 0.086 0.234
See the note to table 4.
When applied to actual data, the Nyblom-Hansen test also fails to reject time
invariance for θ. To examine its power, we conducted another Monte Carlo simulation
using our drifting parameter VAR as a data generating mechanism, and we found
that this test also has low power against our representation. Indeed, the detection
probabilities are a bit lower than those for the sup-LM test.
Boivin (1999) conjectures that the sup-Wald v e r s i o no fA n d r e w s ’ st e s tm a yh a v e
higher power than the others, and so we also consider this procedure. The results,
which are shown in table 6, provide some support for his conjecture. The detection
probability is higher in each case, and it is substantially higher for the inﬂation
equation. Indeed, this is the only case among the ones we study in which the detection
probability exceeds 50 percent. It is noteworthy that in this case we also strongly
reject time invariance in the actual data. Time invariance is also rejected for the VAR
as a whole.
Table 6: Andrews’s sup-Wald Test
Nominal Interest Unemployment Inﬂation VAR
Data F F R 1% R5 %
Power 0.173 0.269 0.711 0.296
Note: ‘R x%’ signiﬁes a rejection at the x percent level.
We made two other attempts to concentrate power in promising directions. The
ﬁrst focuses on parameters of the Clarida, et. al. policy rule. If drift in θ is indeed
a manifestation of changes in monetary policy, then tests for stability of the latter
should be more powerful than for stability of the former. The vector θ has high di-
mension, and the drifting components in θ should lie in a lower-dimensional subspace
corresponding to drifting policy parameters.16 To test stability of the Clarida, et. al.
rule, we estimated a version for the period 1959-2000 using our data and instruments,
and calculated Andrews’s statistics.17 Perhaps surprisingly in light of their results,
the tests fail to reject time invariance (see table 7). We repeated the procedure for
artiﬁcial samples generated from our VAR to check the power of the test. Once again,
the results show that the tests have low detection probabilities.
16This assumes that shifts in policy are the only source of drift in θ.
17We chose Andrews’s tests because the CCG rule is estimated by GMM. The Nyblom-Hansen
t e s ti sb a s e do nM Le s t i m a t e s .




See the note to table 4.
We also tried to increase power by concentrating on a single linear combination of
θ that we think is most likely to vary. The linear combination with greatest variance
is the ﬁrst principal component, and we used the dominant eigenvector of the sample
variance of E(∆θt|T) to measure this component. As ﬁgures 14a n d15i l l u s t r a t e ,
the ﬁrst principal component dominates the variation in θt|T;18 most of the other
principal components are approximately time invariant. The ﬁrst component is also
highly correlated with variation in the features discussed above. Thus it seems to be
a promising candidate on which to concentrate.











Figure 14: Principal Components of θt|T





































corr = 0.96  corr = 0.86 
corr = 0.71  corr = -0.82 
Figure 15: Correlation of First Principal Component with Other Features
18More precisely, the ﬁgures illustrate partial sums of the ﬁrst principal component for ∆θt|T.
29Yet the results of a Monte Carlo simulation, shown in table 8, suggest that power
remains low, with a rejection probability of only about 15 percent. Indeed, the
procedure is inferior to the VAR tests reported above. Agnosticism about drifting
components in θ seems to be better. Despite the low power, one of the tests rejects
time invariance in actual data.
Table 8: Stability of the First Principal Component
sup-LM sup-Wald
Data F R5 %
Power 0.220 0.087
See the note to table 4.
To summarize, most of our tests fail to reject time invariance of θ, but most also
have low power to detect the patterns of drift we describe above. In the one case where
a test has a better-than-even chance of detecting drift in θ, for the data time invariance
is rejected at better than the one-percent level. One reasonable interpretation is that
θ is drifting, but that most of the procedures are unable to detect it.
Perhaps low power should not be a surprise. Our model nests the null of time
invariance as a limiting case, i.e. when Q =0 . One can imagine indexing a family
of alternative models in terms of Q. For Q close to zero, size and power should be
approximately the same. Power should increase as Q gets larger, and eventually the
tests are likely to reject with high probability. But in between there is a range of
alternative models, arrayed in terms of increasing Q, that the tests are unlikely to
reject. The message of the Monte Carlo detection statistics is that a model such as
ours with economically meaningful drift in θ often falls in the indeterminate range.
4C o n c l u s i o n
One respectable view is that either an erroneous model, insuﬃcient patience, or his
inability to commit to a better policy made Arthur Burns respond to the end of
Bretton Woods by administering monetary policy in a way that produced the greatest
p e a c et i m ei n ﬂation in U.S. history; and that an improved model, more patience,
or greater discipline led Paul Volcker to administer monetary policy in a way that
conquered American inﬂation.19 Another respectable view is that what distinguished
Burns and Volcker was not their models or policies but their luck. This paper and
its predecessor (Cogley and Sargent (2001)) ﬁt time series models that might help
distinguish these views.
This paper also responds to Sims’s (2001) and Stock’s (2001) criticism of the
evidence for drifting systematic parts of vector autoregressions in Cogley and Sargent
19See J. Bradford DeLong (1997) and John Taylor (1997).
30(2001) by altering our speciﬁcation to include stochastic volatility. While we have
found evidence for drifting variances within our new speciﬁcation, we continue to
ﬁnd evidence that the VAR coeﬃcients have drifted, mainly along one important
direction. Our model is atheoretical, but for reasons discussed in Appendix A and
also by Sargent (1999) and Luca Benati (2001), the presence of drifting coeﬃcients
contains clues about whether government policy makers’ models or preferences have
evolved over time.
It is appropriate to be cautious in accepting evidence either for or against drift-
ing coeﬃcients. For reasons that are most clear in continuous time (see Anderson,
Hansen, and Sargent (2000)), it is much more diﬃcult to detect evidence for move-
ments in the systematic part of a vector autoregression than it is to detect stochastic
volatility. This situation is reﬂe c t e di nt h er e s u l t so fo u re x p e r i m e n t sw i t hi m p l e m e n t -
ing Bernanke and Mihov’s tests under an artiﬁcial economy with drifting coeﬃcients.
A Theories of economic policy
Contrasting visions of aggregate economic time series that we attribute to Lucas
(1976), Sargent and Wallace (1976), and Sims (1982) can be represented within the
following modiﬁcation of the setting of Lucas and Sargent (1981). A state vector
xt ∈ X evolves according to the possibly nonlinear stochastic diﬀerence equation
xt+1 − xt = f(xt,t,u t,v t,² t+1) (35)
where ut ∈ U is a vector of decisions of private agents, vt ∈ V is a vector of decisions by
the government, and ²t ∈ E is an i.i.d. sequence of random variables with cumulative
distribution function Φ. A particular example of (35) is
xt+1 − xt = µ(xt,t,u t,v t)+σ(xt,t)²t+1 (36)
where Φ is Gaussian. Borrowing terms from the corresponding continuous time dif-
fusion speciﬁcation, we call µ the drift and σ the volatility.






where xt denotes the history of xs,s=0 ,...,t. Under the sequences of decision rules
(37) and (38), equation (36) becomes
xt+1 − xt = µ(xt,t,h(x
t,t),g(x
t,t)) + σ(xt,t)²t+1. (39)
This is a nonlinear vector autoregression with stochastic volatility.
31Economic theory restricts h and g. Private agents’ optimum problems and market
equilibrium conditions imply a mapping20
h = Th(f,g) (40)
from the technology and information process f and the government policy g to the
private sector’s equilibrium policy h.G i v e n Th, the normative theory of economic







tW(xt,u t,v t) (41)
where W is a one-period welfare criterion and the optimization is subject to (36) and
(40). Notice that the government chooses both g and h, although its manipulation of
h is subject to (40). Problem (41) is called a Stackelberg or Ramsey problem.
Lucas’s (1976) Critique was directed against a faulty econometric policy evaluation







tW(xt,u t,v t) (42)
s u b j e c tt o( 3 6 )a n dh = ˆ h,w h e r eˆ h is a ﬁxed sequence of decision rules for the
private sector. Lucas pointed out ﬁrst that problem (42) ignores (40) and second
that a particular class of models that had been used for ˆ h were misspeciﬁed because
they imputed irrational expectations to private decision makers. Let us express the
government’s possibly misspeciﬁed econometric model for ˆ h through
ˆ h = S(f,g,h), (43)
w h i c hm a p st h et r u t ha se m b o d i e di nt h ef,g,h that actually generate the data into
the government’s beliefs about private agents’ behavior. The function S embodies
the government’s model speciﬁcation and also its estimation procedures. See Sargent
(1999) for a concrete example of S within a model of the Phillips curve.
The faulty policy evaluation problem (42) induces
g = Tg(f,ˆ h). (44)
The heart of the Lucas critique is that this mapping does not solve the appropriate
policy problem (41).
20See Stokey (1989) for a description of how households’ optimum problems and market clear-
ing are embedded in the mapping (40). Stokey clearly explains why the policies h,g are history
dependent.
21Sargent (1999) calls this a “Phelps problem”.
32A.1 Positive implications of imperfect policy making
What outcomes should we expect under the faulty econometric policy evaluation pro-
cedure? The answer depends partly on how the government’s econometric estimates
ˆ h respond to observed outcomes through the function (43). Suppose that the gov-
ernment begins with an initial speciﬁcation ˆ h0 and consider the following iterative
process for j ≥ 1:
gj = Tg(f,ˆ hj−1), (45)
hj = Th(f,gj), (46)
ˆ hj = S(f,gj,h j). (47)
In step (45), for ﬁxed ˆ hj−1, the government solves the faulty policy problem (42); in
step (46) the private sector responds to the government policy gj;i ns t e p( 4 7 ) ,t h e
government adjusts its econometric model ˆ hj to reﬂect outcomes under government
policy gj. We can write the iterative process more compactly as
gj = B(f,gj−1) (48)
where B(f,gj−1)=Tg(f,S(f,gj−1,T h(f,gj−1))). Eventually, this iterative process
might settle down to a ﬁxed point
g = B(f,g). (49)
In the spirit of Fudenberg and Levine (1993), Fudenberg and Kreps (1995), and
Sargent (1999), a self-conﬁrming equilibrium is a government policy g that satisﬁes
(49) and an associated government belief ˆ h.
In the following subsections, we ﬁrst use the iterative scheme (45), (46), (47) to
make contact with part of Lucas’s critique. Then we relate the ﬁxed point (49) to
the views and practices of Sims (1982, 1999).
A.2 Adaptation: reconciling two parts of the Lucas critique
Lucas’s (1976) Critique consisted of two parts. The ﬁrst part of Lucas’s paper sum-
marized empirical evidence for drift in representations like (36), that is, dependence
of µ on t, and interpreted it as evidence against particular econometric speciﬁcations
that had attributed suboptimal forecasts about (x,v) to private agents. The second
part of his paper focused on three concrete examples designed to show how the map-
ping (40) from g to h would inﬂuence time series outcomes. Though Lucas didn’t
explicitly link the ﬁrst and second parts, a reader can be forgiven for thinking that he
meant to suggest that a substantial part of the drift in µ d e s c r i b e di nt h eﬁrst part
of his paper came from drift in private agents’ decision rules that had been induced
through mapping (40) by drift in government decision rules.
33If we could somehow make a version of the iterative process (45), (46), (47) occur
in real time, we get a model of coeﬃcient drift that is consistent with this vision.
The literature on least squares learning gets such a real time model by attributing to
both private agents and the government a sophisticated kind of adaptive behavior in
which the mappings Tg,T h,S play key roles. This literature uses recursive versions
of least squares learning to deduce drift in g whose average behavior can eventually
be described by the ordinary diﬀerential equation22
d
dt
g = B(f,g) − g. (50)
In this way it is possible to use the transition dynamics of adaptive systems based
on (45), (46), (47) to explain the parameter drift that Lucas emphasized in the ﬁrst
part of his critique. Sargent (1999) and Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002) pursue
this line and use it to build models of drifting unemployment-inﬂation dynamics.23,24
A.3 Another view: asserting a self-conﬁrming equilibrium
Another view takes the data generating mechanism to be the self-conﬁrming equi-
librium composed of (49) and (36), unadorned by any transition dynamics based
on (45), (46), (47).25 This view assumes that any adaptation had ended before the
sample began. It would either exclude parameter drift or else would interpret it as
consistent with a self-conﬁrming equilibrium.26 Thus, parameter drift would reﬂect
nonlinearities in the law of motion (36) that are accounted for in decision making
22See Sargent (1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for examples and for precise statements
of the meanings of ‘average’ and ‘eventually’. Equation (50) embodies the ‘mean dynamics’ of the
system. See Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002) and Sargent (1999). They also describe how ‘escape
dynamics’ can be used to perpetuate adaptation.
23As Bray and Kreps (1986) and Kreps (1998) describe, before it attains a self-conﬁrming equilib-
rium, such an adaptive system embodies irrationality because, while the self-conﬁrming equilibrium
is a rational expectations equilibrium, the least squares transition dynamics are not. During the
transition, both government and private agents are basing decisions on subjective models that ig-
nore sources of time-dependence in the actual stochastic process that are themselves induced by the
transition process. Bray and Kreps (1986) and Kreps (1998) celebrate this departure from rational
expectations because they want models of learning about a rational expectations equilibrium, not
learning within a rational expectations equilibrium.
24In their Phillips curve example, Kydland and Prescott (1977) explicitly use an example of
system (45), (46), (47) and compute its limit to argue informally that inﬂation would converge to
a suboptimal ‘time consistent’ level. Unlike Lucas (1976), Kydland and Prescott’s mapping (47)
was ˆ h = h. Lucas’s focus was partly to criticize versions of mapping (47) that violated rational
expectations, but that was not Kydland and Prescott’s concern.
25The literature on least squares learning itself provides substantial support for this perspective
by proving almost sure convergence to a self-conﬁrming equilibrium. Sargent (1999) and Cho,
Williams, and Sargent (2002) arrest such convergence by putting some forgetting or discounting
into least squares.
26Sargent and Wallace (1976), Sims (1982), and Sargent (1984) have all expressed versions of this
point of view.
34processes (i.e., hyperparameters would not be drifting). That g is a ﬁxed point of
(49) either excludes government policy regime shifts or requires that they be inter-
preted as equilibrium government best responses that are embedded in the mapping
Tg in (44) and that are discounted by private agents in the mapping Th.
A.4 Empirical issues
Inspired by theoretical work within the adaptive tradition that permits shifts in policy
outside of a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, our earlier paper (Cogley and Sargent (2001))
used a particular nonlinear vector autoregression (39) to compile evidence about
how the systematic part of the autoregression, xt + µ(xt) in (39), has drifted over
time. Our speciﬁcation excluded stochastic volatility (we assumed that σ(xt,t)=σ).
We appealed to adaptive models and informally interpreted the patterns of ‘drifting
coeﬃcients’ in our nonlinear time series model partly as reﬂecting shifting behavior
rules of the Fed, shifts due to the Fed’s changing preferences or views of the economy.27
Sims (1999) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998a, 1998b) analyzed a similar data set
in a way that seems compatible with a self-conﬁrming equilibrium within a linear
time-invariant structure. They used specializations of the vector time series model
(39) that incorporate stochastic volatility but not drift in the systematic part of a
linear vector autoregression. Their models can be expressed as
xt+1 − xt = Axt + σ(xt,t)²t+1, (51)
w h e r ew ec a nr e g a r dxt as including higher order lags of variables and A is composed
of companion submatrices. They compiled evidence that this representation ﬁts post
World War II data well and used it to interpret the behavior of the monetary authori-
ties. They found that the systematic part of the vector autoregression A did not shift
over time, but that there was stochastic volatility (σ(xt,t) 6= σ). Thus, they recon-
ciled the data with a linear autoregression in which shocks drawn from time-varying
distributions nevertheless feed through the system linearly in a time-invariant way.
They reported a lack of evidence for alterations in policy rules (in contrast to the
perspective taken for example by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000)).
A.5 Generalization
In this paper, we ﬁt a model of the form (39) that, permits both drifting coeﬃcients
and stochastic volatility, thereby generalizing both our earlier model and some of
the speciﬁcations of Bernanke and Mihov and Sims. We use this speciﬁcation to
confront criticisms from Sims (2001) and Stock (2001), both of whom suggested that
our earlier results were mainly artifacts of our exclusion of stochastic volatility.
27Partly we appealed to adaptive models like ones described by Sims (1988) and Sargent (1999),
which emphasize changes in the Fed’s understanding of the structure of the economy.
35B The Relation Between the Restricted and Un-
restricted Models
B.1 Priors





T represents the VAR parameters, Q is their innovation variance, and Ω stands

















Thus, the stability condition truncates and renormalizes the unrestricted prior.
We can factor f(θ













































The term mθ(Q) is the conditional probability of a non-explosive draw from the
unrestricted transition density, f(θ
T|Q), as a function of Q. The number mQ is the
36mean of the conditional probabilities, averaged across draws from the marginal prior
f(Q). Since both are probabilities, it follows that
0 ≤ mθ(Q) ≤ 1, (58)
0 ≤ mQ ≤ 1.
The left-hand inequality for mQ is strict if there is some chance of a non-explosive
draw for some value of Q.F o rﬁnite T there always is.
























(equation 8 in the text). The marginal prior for Ω remains the same as for the
unrestricted model, p(Ω)=f(Ω). Notice that each term is normalized to integrate to
1; i.e., each component is proper.













t−1 represents the history of θs up to date t−1 and θ
t+2,T represents the path




































































The integral in the numerator is the expectation of I(θ
t+2,T) with respect to the
conditional density f(θ
t+2,T|θt+1,Q). This represents the probability that random
walk trajectories emanating from θt+1 will remain in the nonexplosive region from
















38where m(Y T) is the marginal likelihood. After substituting from equations (7) and
























The term in brackets in the numerator is the posterior kernel for the unrestricted
model. After multiplying and dividing by the marginal likelihood for the unrestricted











T,Q,Ω|Y T) is the posterior corresponding to the unrestricted prior, f(·).
The posterior for the restricted model is proportional to the truncation of the pos-
terior of the unrestricted model, with a factor of proportionality depending on the
normalizing constants mQ,m L(Y T), and m(Y T).
C A Markov Chain Monte Carlo Algorithm for
Simulating the Posterior Density
We use MCMC methods to simulate the restricted posterior density. As in our ear-
lier paper, we simulate the unrestricted posterior pU(·|Y T), and then use rejection
sampling to rule out explosive outcomes. The ﬁrst part of this appendix justiﬁes
rejection sampling, and the second describes the algorithm used for simulating draws
from pU(·|Y T).
C.1 Rejection Sampling
The target density is p(θ
T,Q,Ω|Y T),a n dt h ep r o p o s a li spU(θ
T,Q,Ω|Y T). Since the
former is proportional to a truncation of the latter, the proposal is well-deﬁned and
positive on the support of the target. Since the proposal is a probability density, it























This says we accept if θ
T is non-explosive and reject otherwise. Thus, we can sample
from the posterior of the restricted model by simulating the unrestricted model and
discarding the explosive draws.
C.2 Sampling from pU(·|Y T)
We combine the techniques used in Cogley and Sargent (2001) with those of Jacquier,
Polson, and Rossi (1994) to construct a Metropolis-within-Gibbs sampler. The algo-
rithm consists of 5 steps, one for θ
T,Q ,β, the elements of σ,a n dt h ee l e m e n t so f
HT. Our prior is that the blocks of parameters are mutually independent, and we
assume the marginal prior for each block has a natural conjugate form; details are
given above. The ﬁrst two steps of the algorithm are essentially the same as in our
earlier paper, β is treated as a vector of regression parameters, and the elements of
σ are treated as inverse-gamma variates. To sample HT, we apply a univariate algo-
rithm from Jacquier, et. al. to each element. This is possible because the stochastic
volatilities are assumed to be independent.
C.2.1 VAR parameters, θ
T
We ﬁrst consider the distribution of VAR parameters conditional on the data and
other blocks of parameters. Conditional on HT and β, one can calculate the entire
sequence of variances Rt;w ed e n o t et h i ss e q u e n c eb yRT. Conditional on RT and Q,










The unrestricted model is a linear, conditionally Gaussian state-space model. As-
suming a Gaussian prior for θ0, all the conditional densities on the right hand side of
(75) are Gaussian. Their means and variances can be computed via a forward and
backward recursion.
The forward recursion uses the Kalman ﬁlter. Let
θt|t ≡ E(θt |Y
t,Q,R
T), (76)
Pt|t−1 ≡ Va r(θt |Y
t−1,Q,R
T),
Pt|t ≡ Va r(θt |Y
t,Q,R
T),
28The elements of σ are redundant conditional on HT.
40represent conditional means and variances going forward in time. These can be





θt|t = θt−1|t−1 + Kt(yt − X
0
tθt−1|t−1),
Pt|t−1 = Pt−1|t−1 + Q,
Pt|t = Pt|t−1 − KtX
0
tPt|t−1.
At the end of the sample, the forward recursion delivers the mean and variance for




The remaining terms in (75) are derived from a backward recursion, which updates
conditional means and variances to reﬂect the additional information about θt con-
tained in θt+1. Let
θt|t+1 ≡ E(θt |θt+1,Y
t,Q,R
T), (79)
Pt|t+1 ≡ Va r(θt |θt+1,Y
t,Q,R
T),
represent updated estimates of the mean and variance. Because θt is conditionally
normal, these are
θt|t+1 = θt|t + Pt|tP
−1
t+1|t(θt+1 − θt|t), (80)
Pt|t+1 = Pt|t − Pt|tP
−1
t+1|tPt|t.





A random trajectory for θ
T is generated by iterating backward. The backward re-
cursion starts with a draw of θT from (78). Then, conditional on its realization, θT−1
is drawn from (81), θT−2 is drawn conditional on the realization of θT−1, and so on
back to the beginning of the sample.
C.2.2 Innovation Variance for VAR Parameters, Q:
The next step involves the distribution of Q conditional on the data and other para-
meter blocks. Conditional on a realization for θ
T, the VAR parameter innovations,








Knowledge of σ is redundant conditional on HT,a n dβ and HT are irrelevant because
vt is independent of ξt and ηit.
41Under the linear transition law, vt is iid normal. The natural conjugate prior in
this case is an inverse-Wishart distribution, with scale parameter Q and degrees of






1 ,T 1), (83)
with scale and degree-of-freedom parameters,




T1 = T0 + T.
C.2.3 Standard Deviation of Volatility Innovations, σ





Knowledge of Q is redundant conditional on θ
T. The latter conveys information
about vt and εt, but both are conditionally independent of the volatility innovations.29
Thus, conditioning on θ
T is also irrelevant. β orthogonalizes Rt and therefore carries
information about Ht, but this is redundant given direct observations on Ht. Given a
realization for HT, one can compute the scaled volatility innovations, σiηit,i=1 ,...,3.
Because the volatility innovations are mutually independent, we can work with the








and similarly for σ2
2 and σ2
3.
The scaled volatility innovations are iid normal with mean zero and variance σ2
i.
Assuming an inverse-gamma prior with scale parameter δ0 and υ0 degrees of freedom,














υ1 = υ0 + T, (87)




29The measurement innovations are informative for Rt, which depends indirectly on σ,b u tt h i s
information is subsumed in Ht.
42C.2.4 Covariance Parameters, β
Next, we consider the distribution of β conditional on the data and other parameters.
Knowledge of θ
T and Y T implies knowledge of εt, which satisﬁes
Bεt = ut, (89)
where ut is a vector of orthogonalized residuals with known error variance Ht.W e
interpret this as a system of unrelated regressions. The ﬁrst equation in the system
is the identity
ε1t = u1t. (90)

















with independent standard normal residuals.
Once again, many of the conditioning variables drop out. Q and σ are redundant
conditional on θ
T and HT, respectively, and hT
j ,j6= i, are irrelevant because the
elements of ut are independent. Assuming a normal prior for the regression coeﬃcients
in each equation,
f(βi)=N(βi0,V i0),i =2 ,3, (92)















i0 βi0 + Z
0
izi). (95)
The variables zi and Zi refer to the left and right-hand variables, respectively, in the
transformed regressions.
C.2.5 Stochastic Volatilities, HT
The ﬁnal step involves the conditional distribution of the elements of HT.T os a m p l e
the stochastic volatilities, we apply the univariate algorithm of Jacquier, et. al. (1994)
to each element of the orthogonalized VAR residuals, ut. The latter are observable
conditional on Y T, θ
T, and B. We can proceed on a univariate basis because the
stochastic volatilities are mutually independent.







43where h−it represents the vector of h’s at all other dates. The simpliﬁcation follows
from the assumption that hit is Markov. Knowledge of Q is redundant given θ
T, and
hT
j and σj, i 6= j, are irrelevant because the stochastic volatilities are independent.
By Bayes’ theorem, the conditional kernel can be expressed as30
f(hit|hit−1,h it+1,u
T

















Its form follows from the normal form of the conditional likelihood, f(uit|hit), and
the log-normal form of the log-volatility equation, (15). The parameters µit and σ2
ic
are the conditional mean and variance of hit implied by (15) and knowledge of hit−1
and hit+1. In the random walk case, they are
µit =( 1 /2)(lnhit+1 +l nhit−1), (98)
σ
2
ic =( 1 /2)σ
2
i.
Notice that the normalizing constant is absent from (97). Jacquier, et. al. say the
normalizing constant is costly to compute, and they recommend a Metropolis step
instead of a Gibbs step. One natural way to proceed is to draw a trial value for hit
from the log-normal density implied by (15), and then use the conditional likelihood









































it if the proposal is rejected. The algorithm is applied on a date-by-
date basis to each of the elements of ut.
References
Aguilar, Omar and Mike West, 2001, “Bayesian Dynamic Factor Models and
Portfolio Allocation,’ Journal of Business and Economic Statistics.
30The formulas are a bit diﬀerent at the beginning and end of the sample.
44Anderson, Evan, Lars Peter Hansen, and Thomas J. Sargent, 2000, “Robustness,
Detection, and the Price of Risk,” Mimeo, Department of Economics, Stanford Uni-
versity.
Andrews, Donald W.K., 1993, “Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural
Change with Unknown Change Point,” Econometrica 61,p p .8 2 1-856.
Benati, Luca, 2001, “Investigating Inﬂation Dynamics Across Monetary Regimes:
Taking the Lucas Critique Seriously,” Bank of England working paper.
Bernanke, Ben S. and Ilian Mihov, 1998a, “The Liquidity Eﬀect and Long-Run
Neutrality.” In Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 49, Bennett
T. McCallum and Charles I. Plosser, eds. (Amsterdam: North Holland), pp. 149-194.
and , 1998b, “Measuring Monetary Policy.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 113, August, pp. 869-902.
Boivin, Jean, 1999, “Revisiting the Evidence on the Stability of Monetary VARs,”
unpublished manuscript, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University.
Bray, Margaret M. and David Kreps, 1986, “Rational Learning and Rational
Expectations,” in W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett, eds., Essays in Honor of
Kenneth J. Arrow (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK).
Cho, In Koo, Noah Williams, and Thomas J. Sargent, 2002, “Escaping Nash
Inﬂation,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, January, pp. 1—40.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler, 2000, “Monetary Policy Rules
and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 115(1), pp. 147-180.
Cogley, Timothy and Thomas J. Sargent, 2001, “Evolving Post World War II U.S.
Inﬂation Dynamics, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 16, pp. 331-373.
DeLong, J. Bradford, 1997, “America’s Only Peacetime Inﬂation: the 1970’s,”
in Christina Romer and David Romer (eds.), Reducing Inﬂation. NBER Studies in
Business Cycles, Volume 30.
Evans, George W. and Seppo Honkapohja, 2001, Learning and Expectations in
Macroeconomics (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey).
Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine, 1993, “Self-Conﬁrming Equilibrium,”
Econometrica 61, pp.523-545.
and David M. Kreps, 1995, “Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Conﬁrming
Equilibria,” Games and Economic Behavior 8, pp. 20-55.
Hansen, Bruce E., 1992, “Testing For Parameter Instability in Linear Models,”
Journal of Policy Modeling 14, pp. 517-533.
Ireland, Peter, 1999, “Does the Time-Consistency Problem Explain the Behavior
of Inﬂa t i o ni nt h eU n i t e dS t a t e s ? ”Journal of Monetary Economics 44(2), pp. 279-
292.
45Jacquier, Eric, Nicholas G. Polson, and Peter Rossi, 1994, “Bayesian Analysis of
Stochastic Volatility Models,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 12, pp.
371-418.
, ,a n d , , 1999, “Stochastic Volatility: Univariate and Multivariate Ex-
tensions,” unpublished manuscript, Finance Department, Boston College and Grad-
uate School of Business, University of Chicago.
Kim, Chang-Jin and Charles R. Nelson, 1999a, “Has The U.S. Economy Become
More Stable? A Bayesian Approach Based on a Markov Switching Model of the
Business Cycle,” Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4), 608-661.
Kreps, David, 1998, “Anticipated Utility and Dynamic Choice,” Mimeo, 1997
Schwartz Lecture, Northwestern University.
Kydland, Finn and Edward C. Prescott, 1977, “Rules Rather than Discretion: the
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy 85, pp. 473-491.
Leeper, Eric and Tao Zha, 2001a, “Empirical Analysis of Policy Interventions,”
Mimeo, Department of Economics, Indiana University and Research Department,
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
and , 2001b, “Toward a Theory of Modest Policy Interventions,” Mimeo,
Department of Economics, Indiana University and Research Department, Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., 1976, “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique,” in
The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets, edited by Karl Brunner and Alan Meltzer,
Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, vol. 1.
and Thomas J. Sargent, 1981, “Introduction” in Robert E. Lucas and Thomas
J. Sargent (eds.) Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice (Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press).
McCallum, Bennett T., 1999, “Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules” in
Taylor, John B. and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics vol. 1C
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Science).
McConnell, Margaret and Gabriel Perez Quiros, 2000, “Output Fluctuations in
the United States: What Has Changed Since the Early 1980s?” American Economic
Review 90(5), 1464-1476.
Nyblom, Jukka, 1989, “Testing for the Constancy of Parameters Over Time,”
Journal of the American Statistical Association 84, pp. 223-230.
Parkin, Michael, 1993, “Inﬂa t i o ni nN o r t hA m e r i c a , ”i nPrice Stabilization in the
1990s, edited by Kumiharo Shigehara.
Pitt, Mark and Neil Shepard, 1999, “Time-Varying Covariances: A Factor Sto-
chastic Volatility Approach,” in Bayesian Statistics 6, J.M. Bernardo, J.O. Berger,
A.P. Dawid, and A.F.M. Smith, eds., (Oxford University Press: Oxford).
46Romer, Christina D. and David H. Romer, 2002, “The Evolution of Economic
Understanding and Postwar Stabilization Policy,” forthcoming in the 2002 Jackson
Hole conference volume, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Rudebusch, Glenn D. and Lars E.O. Svensson, 1999, “Policy Rules for Inﬂation
Targeting,” in Monetary Policy Rules,e d i t e db yJ o h nB .T a y l o r ,N B E RC o n f e r e n c e
Report (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, Illinois).
Samuelson, Paul A., and Robert M. Solow, 1960. “Analytical Aspects of Anti-
Inﬂation Policy,” American Economic Review, Vol 50, May, pp. 177—184.
Sargent, Thomas J., 1999, The Conquest of American Inﬂation (Princeton Uni-
versity Press: Princeton, New Jersey).
1984, “Autoregressions, Expectations, and Advice,” American Economic Re-
view, Papers and Proceedings 74, pp. 408-415.
and Neil Wallace, 1976, “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Economic
Policy,” Journal of Monetary Economics 2, pp. 169-183.
Sims, Christopher A., 1980, “Comparison of Interwar and Postwar Business Cy-
cles: Monetarism Reconsidered”, American Economic Review, pp. 250-257.
, 1982, “Policy Analysis with Econometric Models,” B r o o k i n g sP a p e r so nE c o -
nomic Activity,V o l .1,p p .107-152.
, 1988, “Projecting Policy Eﬀects with Statistical Models,” Revista de Analysis
Economico 3, pp. 3-20.
, 1999. “Drifts and Breaks in Monetary Policy,” mimeo, Princeton University.
,2 0 0 1, “Comment on Sargent and Cogley’s ‘Evolving Post World War II U.S.
Inﬂation Dynamics,”’ NBER Macroeconomics Annual 16, pp 373-379.
Sims, Christopher A. and Tao Zha, 1999, “Error Bands for Impulse Responses,”
Econometrica 67, pp. 1113-1155.
Stock, James H., 2001, “Discussion of Cogley and Sargent ‘Evolving Post World
War II U.S. Inﬂation Dynamics,”’ NBER Macroeconomics Annual 16, pp. 379-387.
Stokey, Nancy L., 1989, “Reputation and Time Consistency,” American Economic
Review, Papers and Proceedings 79, pp. 134-139.
Taylor, John B., (1993), “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,” in Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 39, December, pp. 195—214.
1997, “Comment on America’s Only Peacetime Inﬂation: the 1970’s,” in
Christina Romer and David Romer (eds.), Reducing Inﬂation.N B E R S t u d i e s i n
Business Cycles, Volume 30.
Whittle, Peter, 1953, “The Analysis of Multiple Stationary Time Series,” Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society,S e r i e sB ,v o l .15, pp. 125-139.
47